Pick a Number...Any Number, Part
II
by Adrian Ash
BullionVault
Wednesday, 17 June 2009
"We didn't abandon the money-supply aggregates.
They abandoned us..."
TIME WAS that central banks targeted and fretted about keeping their currency stable
against the Dollar.
But as the Dollar-led inflation of
1950-1980 destroyed the value of bonds and savings worldwide – and then
destroyed equities, as well as any sober hope of business and hiring plans – policy-makers
tried to target instead the volume of cash flowing around their domestic
economy.
Monetarism in turn fell apart as
first the mid-80s "super Dollar" and then globalized deregulation of
finance pulled the various "M" aggregates down, up and finally out of
the window. "We didn't abandon the aggregates," says one practitioner
in Steven Solomon's 1995 book The Confidence
Game; "they abandoned us."
Central banks already had a new
hope at hand, however. But now that theory – inflation targeting – is falling
apart after almost 20 years of apparent success. And so the monetarists are
back, in practice if not in policy statements.
What else do you think
"quantitative easing" aims to achieve if not easier quantities of
cash flowing from banks to business and households? And how can inflation
targeting – whether explicit as in the UK, or generally guessed to be the chief aim, as in the United States – possibly survive this crisis given the failure of
policy-makers to either hit target or reduce volatility?

It's not simply the impact of
monetary policy on consumer inflation which has gone "off message" in
2009.
Extending their remit – and now hoping
also to control longer-term interest rates as well as overnight money rates in
the "open" market – central banks are signally failing to cap either
the yield or volatility of long-term government bonds. The 10-year US Treasury
bond, formerly the financial world's modern "Gold Standard"
equivalent – has never offered such wide-swinging returns.
Most disastrous for policy wonks
pulling this lever and pushing that button, you have to go back to the Great
Depression – when central banks still nailed exchange rates and the volume of money
to a tightly supplied quantum of Gold Bullion bars – to
find uncertainty about quite where the cost of living will stand running this
great, this fast. The month-on-month rate of change in US consumer prices has
been three times as vicious since December as the CPI's previous six-decade
average. Here in the UK, consumer-price inflation has now overshot the
official 2.0% target for 20 months running, even as the previous measure of
living expenses – the Retail Price Index – has sunk below zero.
"We didn't abandon the
inflation target," the Bank of England will no doubt declare. "It
abandoned us..."

Thing is – and as with any social experiment,
such as the London Gold Pool's attempt to cap the price of gold in Dollars at
$35 an ounce, finally abandoned in March 1968 – trying to observe as well as
influence the "out-turn" of inflation means neither task is done very
well, if at all.
Promising to buy and sell gold in
the "open" market at a fixed price lower than private traders would
bid, the Gold Pool only invited fresh pressure on their fast-shrinking
stockpiles. Defending that $35 price – itself arbitrarily set by President
Roosevelt at a series of jovial breakfast meetings three decades before –
showed the absurdity of any particular fixed value for gold in a world awash
with money.
Now in 2009, and slashing rates
towards zero to try and force savers out of cash and boost new mortgage debt,
the Bank of England has itself caused those sub-zero readings on the Retail
Price data – the very opposite of what it set out to do. Because those numbers
include mortgage-interest payments each month. Whereas the Bank's mandated
target of 2.0% is pegged against the mortgage-less Consumer Price index. And on
the logic of that measure alone, not least with oil prices about to start
pushing higher on the year-on-year figure as the spike of July '08 fades from
the series, interest rates should in fact now stand higher, rather than
encouraging yet further hikes in the cost of living.
What to do? At this pace, we'll
all join the Swiss in quietly setting targets for foreign exchange rates and
ranges, hoping to side-step deflation at the expense of our neighbors' overseas
exports. Already in March this year, the Bank of England's Spencer Dale cheered
the fact that "the marked depreciation in Sterling should support demand, both at home and abroad, for domestically produced
output." But that exchange-rate gain was swiftly undone as the Pound then
raced back towards $1.65 to the Dollar, knocking 18% off the Gold Price in
Sterling and widening the UK's trade deficit to £7.0bn in April from March's
eight-year low of £6.5bn.
How to escape this policy nightmare? Besides yet
more volatility, we guess here at BullionVault that only one thing is certain. Central bankers scrabbling around
for a new "Hey! This might
work" policy to square the circle of full employment with low, stable
inflation are guaranteed not to apply a fixed limit on the absolute volume of
cash, as set by some implicit if not official Gold Standard.
Sure, if policy-makers,
politicians and the rest of us would only abandon the hope of costless
inflation, then yes – a Gold Standard might well appeal. But the promise of
above-average wealth for everyone makes yawning debt a necessity, and that
makes a commodity-linked supply of money untenable. And anyone who tells you
otherwise needs to review not only the one policy lesson taken away by every
economic advisor who's studied the Great Depression, but also how unstable the
"stability" of precious-metal standards proved in practice beforehand.
|
|
Trend
|
Commodities index
(% change)
|
Purchasing power of
silver
|
Purchasing power of
gold
|
|
1623-1658
|
Inflation
|
+51
|
-34
|
-34
|
|
1658-1669
|
Deflation
|
-21
|
+27
|
+42
|
|
1675-1695
|
Inflation
|
+27
|
-13
|
-21
|
|
1702-1723
|
Inflation
|
+25
|
-18
|
-22
|
|
1752-1776
|
Inflation
|
+27
|
-22
|
-21
|
|
1792-1813
|
Inflation
|
+92
|
-33
|
-27
|
|
1818-1851
|
Deflation
|
-58
|
+69
|
+70
|
|
1873-1896
|
Deflation
|
-45
|
-6
|
+82
|
|
1897-1920
|
Inflation
|
+305
|
-61
|
-67
|
|
1920-1933
|
Deflation
|
-69
|
+32
|
+251
|
|
1934-1979
|
Inflation
|
+2,149
|
+241
|
+27
|
Source:
Silver:
The Restless Metal, Roy Jastram (Wiley, 1981)
Digging deep in the
archives three decades ago, Professor Roy W.Jastram
of the University of California at Berkeley found that –
while relatively constant across broad sweeps of history – holding gold even
amid a Gold Standard didn't do much to smooth
short-term volatility in prices.
As the table above
shows, taken from Jastram's analysis of "the
English experience" across 366 years, neither silver or
gold overcame shorter-term shocks to the cost of living, typically driven
upwards by war. Indeed, the post-Gold Standard inflation of the 20th century
proved the only exception. Precious metals rose ahead of the cost of living,
gaining real value as the value of money diminished and commodities leapt.
Whereas until the end of first the Silver, then bi-metallic and finally Gold
Standard in the mid-1930s, it was deflation which boosted the real purchasing
power of precious metals – then, unlike now, hard cash you could take to the
shops and exchange at the bank.
Quite what this means
for central bankers now seeking the next number to chase in their monthly
meetings, we neither know nor care. But for private investors seeking a little
stability in their own savings and wealth, the one certainty remains vicious,
violent changes in value, no matter what digit on what metric is chosen.
Adrian Ash
BullionVault
Gold price chart, no
delay | Gold in 2009
Formerly
City correspondent for The Daily Reckoning in London and head of editorial at
the UK's leading financial advisory for private investors, Adrian Ash is the
editor of Gold News and head of
research at BullionVault – winner of
the Queen's Award for Enterprise Innovation, 2009 – where you can Buy Gold Today vaulted in
Zurich on $3 spreads and 0.8% dealing fees.
(c)
BullionVault 2009
Please Note: This article
is to inform your thinking, not lead it. Only you can decide the best place for
your money, and any decision you make will put your money at risk. Information
or data included here may have already been overtaken by events – and must be
verified elsewhere – should you choose to act on it.