Junior Mining Stocks: Canada’s Subprime
Source: The Gold
Report - Trey Wasser, Pilot Point Partners 12/12/2008
Prior to the recent market
meltdown, the market for junior mining companies had already been experiencing
a severe correction since its peak in early 2007. Despite rising and
historically high metal prices, money began leaving the market, in earnest, in
the summer of 2007. By late last year, the correction had become a full-fledged
bear market. Then the credit markets collapsed in September 2008. This caused
another leg down which also included the major mining companies and the
underlying commodities. Many junior mining stocks are now trading at a market
capitalization that is less than their cash holdings. Most are down over 80%
from their 2007 highs. What went wrong in a market that held so much promise
just 18 months ago? How can the market undervalue precious metal properties at
$800 gold and $10 silver? Will the markets for junior mining stocks ever recover?

To answer these questions, we
must look very closely at the cause of the demise. Unlike in the late 1990’s,
there is no Bre-Ex to take the blame. There is not
one major speculative company, with salted samples and geologists jumping from
helicopters, for the market to point to and say “they ruined it for all of us.”
The fact is that in an environment of easy credit, wild speculation and an
“it’s different this time” attitude, many investors have been caught
shamelessly doubling and tripling down in junior mining stocks that are now
simply doomed to fail.
The parallels between the
mortgage market in the United States and the junior mining market in Canada are striking because they are a product
of the same loose credit policies. Based on the false premise that everyone
should own a home, American bankers and brokers were allowed to leverage the
housing market with a seemingly endless supply of mortgage-backed securities.
They then leveraged these securities many times creating today’s still
incalculable risk in derivative products. Today, shareholders are losing all
their equity. Bankers and management have already made millions in fees,
salaries and bonuses that were based on the “paper profits” from all these
leveraged securitized transactions.
While we won’t (but probably
could) make the case that Canadian investment banks operated on the like
premise that everyone should run a mining company, the process is very similar.
As money from yen carry trades and other loose credit sources poured into the
Canadian Venture Exchange, PPOs, RTOs
and IPOs flourished in the mining sector. A retired
geologist and a financier could joint venture a property in an obscure part of
some third world country and become a mining company. The bankers would gladly
raise them $5 million, then $5 million more for fees that often approached 10%
and also included a piece of the pie. The process was fueled by greed as “blue
sky” was promoted as an “asset”, as defined by a 43-101 report. Insiders made
millions on their private placement shares as the process was repeated over and
over. No one really cared if there was a truly developable project in many of
the “shells." Drill rigs began turning, with geologists in charge, and a
belief that the equity window would never close. Investment bankers were highly
compensated, but few of the companies ever even received (or warranted)
research coverage.
Leverage was added as companies
morphed themselves into separate entities, one for gold, one for silver and one
for base metal. Senior executives were often found starting a new company while
still holding management positions at several others. The bigger the “blue sky”
the more money a company could raise. In many cases, less than fifty cents of
every dollar actually went into the ground as promotion budgets swelled. Many
of the majors were even caught in the folly and invested into some overpriced
or questionable projects. This added to the speculation as the ‘buyout”
business model replaced the concept of building a legitimate mining company.
However, when buyout offers did appear they were often rejected. Management
proved unwilling to part with their ticket to the equity window and their place
at the feed trough.
Barrick Gold’s (NYSE:ABX) 2006 buyout offer for NovaGold (TSX:NG) (AMEX:NG)
was deemed inadequate by management and rejected. When the dust had cleared in
April 2007, it marked the exact top of the market for the Venture Exchange. Barrick explained that their “fair and final offer of $16”
was based on “deteriorating economics at Galore Creek and the newly filed
litigation at Rock Creek." At the time, these appeared to be face-saving
excuses for a failed tender offer. Today, they seem more prophetic, as NovaGold struggles to survive.

Interestingly, many of the
pundits and gold bugs who have been warning of the leverage and speculation in
the U.S. mortgage/derivatives markets failed to
recognize the same risk in the junior mining stocks. Most also failed to
predict the deluge for mining stocks as those loose credit policies were
arrested and unwound. Many actually participated in the leverage at the private
placement level. Today, they continue to bash the U.S. Dollar although it
stubbornly remains the safe haven currency in a financially troubled world.
Where do we go from here and
when does the market for junior mining stocks recover? Unfortunately for
shareholders, a majority of the companies will never recover. Many are out of
cash and have no prospects for additional equity. These will slowly fold and
their only legacy will be as historic drill results. Some companies have
developed bankable assets and might secure some type of debt financing. The
process will be slow and painful, much like mortgage foreclosures. Many cash
strapped companies are now in “hunker down” mode. It appears that “hunker down”
is mining terminology for “stop all operations and cover G&A as long as
possible." When their cash is depleted, many of them will also fold.
Unfortunately, even some of the
best juniors failed to focus their resources on a flagship property and advance
it into an actual development project. Easy capital enticed them to build a
“pipeline” of properties more appropriate for larger companies. Investors were
easily swayed with this “irons in the fire” business model. Today the market is
seeing these undeveloped properties for what they are, liabilities not assets.
There are a few that were smart (and lucky) enough to advance a project that is
truly developable. These will receive additional equity, albeit at substantial
dilution to existing shareholders. Others will proceed, without shareholders,
as debt holders take over the projects. Some will merge. But, mergers won’t
bail out existing shareholders as few premiums will be paid in the
consolidations. Even the companies with projects nearing production are finding
it difficult to finance construction in the current market. Companies with once
profitable poly-metallic mines are being forced into “care and maintenance” at
current base metal prices.
Easy capital is mostly
inefficient capital. Looking at mining projects today, it is amazing to see
just how little was actually created with the billions invested into the junior
sector over the past several years. The capital was simply spread too thin. Way
too many companies were created. But, like the mortgage market, it was mostly
the securitization process that created profits for insiders, bankers and
management.
With mortgage backed securities,
somewhere underneath all that paper, is a house. The sub-prime analogy stops
here. Obviously there will be no bailout for junior mining companies, but there
will be survivors. There are some real developable mining assets, under all
that paper, that are currently being severely undervalued. Unlike most other
assets, gold continues to hold on to the bulk of its gains of the past five
years. Base metals appear to be forming a bottom and their current
underperformance relative to gold cannot be sustained. President-elect Obama has stated that he will develop a series of
infrastructure-based jobs programs in the U.S. This build-out will compete for metals
with China, India and other emerging countries as their
growth accelerates in a worldwide economic recovery. Money will begin to flow
back into commodities and other hard assets as credit market free up, early
next year.
In this financially challenged
market it is still difficult to differentiate the “baby from the
bathwater." Our North American Gold & Silver Explorers Model is currently
following 24 companies we believe will survive to drill another day. Companies
with cash flow or high cash balances will not only survive, but will be
positioned to acquire new assets as other companies fail or drop properties. We
are currently positioning our clients for a strong rally beginning in Q1, 2009.
A few of our favorites:
We recently visited Capital Gold’s (CGLD) (CGC.TO) El Chanate
mine in Sonora. This is truly a first class operation.
They are now producing close to 5000 ounces of gold per month at a cash cost of
about $270. We believe that they will continue to increase production and
achieve a 70,000-ounce profile in 2009. Capital has $11MM in cash, solid cash-flow
and open credit lines. Being a U.S. company, their mining costs are
currently benefitting from a stronger dollar versus
the Peso. They are well positioned to pick up additional assets in Mexico.
Fortuna
Silver (TSX.V:FVI) (NYSE:FVI) has over $40MM in
cash and is operating their Cuylloma Mine in Peru at a small profit. They were smart
enough to hedge the lead and zinc production, although most of the hedge will
roll off in Q4. Next year they intend to shift production to the bonanza silver
veins they have recently discovered on the property to keep the mine cash-flow
positive. Fortuna has consolidated their San Jose property in Oaxaca, Mexico and should have an updated resource out
early next year. They have completed construction on the first phase of the
ramp and infill drilling continues to produce excellent results. We believe
that the San
Jose
resource could grow to over 100MM silver equivalent ounces.
Eastmain Resources (TSX:ER)
(ER.TO) has well over $20MM in cash from their recent offering and warrant
exercises. Their corporate burn rate is very low and drilling costs in Quebec are partially offset with tax credits.
The cash will support their current ($4MM) exploration budget for the next 5
years. Eastmain’s flagship asset is their Eau Claire deposit in James Bay, Quebec. They already have about 1MM ounces
(indicated /inferred) and drill results continue to indicate a much larger
resource. They will benefit from the infrastructure build-out at Goldcorp's (TSX:G) (NYSE:GG) Eleonore mining camp. They have joint ventured their Eleonore South property with Goldcorp
who is funding the current drill program. They also have several other
properties surrounding the new camp.
C.
F. Wasser III (Trey), President
& Director of Research, Pilot Point Partners, has been in the
brokerage and venture capital business for over 23 years. Trey spent 20 years
as a bond salesman and trader with Merrill Lynch, Kidder Peabody and Paine
Webber. He specialized in corporate cash management and his clientele included
many Fortune 100 companies and institutional money managers. In 1993, he formed
III-D Capital LLC to assist early staged technology companies developing
business plans and securing venture capital financing. Today, III-D Capital is
involved in various consulting and finance activities for mining companies Trey
organizes site visits for analysts and fund managers through DD Tours LLC where
he is President. He consults with FINRA and other regulatory agencies on a
pro-bono basis.
Disclosures:
1. This report has been written for informational purposes only and strictly
reflects the opinion of the analyst on the date of publication. Opinions may
change at any time without notice. No earnings projections or target prices are
intended or implied. All conclusions are drawn from information provided by the
company which the analyst has made a “best efforts” attempt to verify and
confirm, but its accuracy and completeness is not guaranteed. While this report
has not necessarily been written in accordance with current SEC regulations and
the Standards of Practice developed by the Chartered Financial Analyst
Institute (CFAI), the opinions herein are believed to be consistent, reasonable
and supportable.
2. The research analyst principally responsible for preparing this report was
Trey Wasser, President of Pilot Point Partners, LLC.
3. Pilot Point Partners LLC, its affiliates and family may have positions and
effect transactions in the securities or options of the issuers reported
herein.
4. Pilot Point Partners LLC, its affiliates and family have received no direct
compensation for this research report.
5. Mr. Wasser is a Principal of DD Tours LLC and may
be involved in arranging site tours of a company’s properties and may receive
compensation based upon various factors involved with these tours.
6. Mr. Wasser is a Principal of III-D Capital and may
have other agreements, including finders fee agreements with companies,
mentioned in this report, regarding potential joint ventures and/or property
sales and may receive compensation based upon various factors involved with
these agreements.
7. The research provided herein should not be considered a complete analysis of
every material fact regarding the companies, industries or securities named
above.
8. This report was prepared exclusively for the benefit of institutional
investors and Pilot Point Partners may receive compensation directly or in soft
dollar arrangements.
9.Additional information and disclosures on the
subject companies is available upon request.
10. As of the date of this report, Pilot Point Partners LLC, its affiliates or
family hold positions in CGLD, FVI and ER. They do not hold any positions in
the common stock of any other companies mentioned in this report.
11. As of the date of this report, DD Tours has been compensated by CGLD for
analyst tours within the past 12 months.
12. As of the date of this report, III-D Capital has no finders fee agreements
with any companies mentioned in this report.
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